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Abstract The implementation of Horizontal Monitoring (HM) in Austria represents
a shift in the prevailing command-and-control paradigm towards enhanced coop-
eration between taxpayers and tax authorities. In the present paper, we assess how
HM is perceived by different stakeholder groups when it was introduced as a pilot
project embedded in the ‘‘Fair Play Initiative’’ launched by the Austrian Ministry of
Finance. We collected quantitative and qualitative data from tax auditors and staff
of tax offices responsible for large-scale enterprises who were either directly
involved or not involved in the HM pilot project, from employees of participating
enterprises as well as from employees of enterprises which did not participate in the
project. Results show that representations of HM were most positive among
employees from HM companies and tax officials directly involved, whereas par-
ticipants from the tax administration who did not take part in the project were
skeptical at the beginning and remained skeptical over time. As shown in organi-
zational change studies, the acceptance or resistance regarding the paradigm change
represented by HM may originate from uncertainty and misperceptions of its goals
and strategies and from speculations, particularly by poorly informed members.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities has been
strictly hierarchical and was characterized by retrospective audits and the threat of
fines as means to enforce compliance. This approach is based on the neo-classical
economic model, which assumes that tax compliance and evasion are merely the
result of a rational decision process under risk with the goal of maximizing one’s
own utility (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). In contrast to the rational model,
psychological theories hold that social representations of taxation, personal norms
and social norms, perceptions of distributive and procedural justice, and trust in the
authorities shape taxpayers’ behavior (Kirchler 2007; Tyler 1997). Psychological
research emphasizes the importance of respectful treatment of taxpayers and service
provision which promote voluntary compliance and should be regarded as
supplements to enforcement measures (Alm and Torgler 2011). Tax authorities
need to balance enforcement measures and respectful treatment in order to maintain
the ‘‘psychological contract’’ of cooperation with taxpayers to effectively promote
voluntary tax compliance (Feld and Frey 2007).
The command-and-control paradigm has long prevailed among tax authorities
fighting tax evasion and it is still the dominant paradigm in practice. However, at
least since globally operating corporations engage in increasingly aggressive tax
planning and tax avoidance strategies rather than in illegal activities such as
evasion, the limitations of the command-and-control paradigm have become
evident. In 2008, the OECD Forum on Tax Administration (OECD 2008) developed
the concept of ‘‘enhanced relationships’’, later coined ‘‘cooperative compliance’’
(OECD 2013), in order to face the new challenges of globally interlaced taxation
systems, such as aggressive tax planning and flight to tax havens. Moreover,
research in economic psychology and behavioral economics has contributed to
rethinking public administration paradigms and has promoted the development of
concepts such as ‘‘Good Public Governance’’. The Austrian approach to ‘‘Good
Public Governance’’ explicitly acknowledges the importance of cooperative
relations and services (Ehrke-Rabel and Gunacker-Slawitsch 2014; Mu¨ller 2014).
In cooperative compliance programs such as Horizontal Monitoring (HM), the
strictly ‘‘vertical’’ relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, which is based
on command-and-control, is challenged. Instead, cooperation at eye level and the
adherence to fair rules are expected to bear advantages for both taxpayers and
authorities. The move from ‘‘vertical’’ to ‘‘horizontal monitoring’’ is expected to
promote mutual trust and cooperation by means of commercial awareness,
impartiality, proportionality, and responsiveness by the tax authorities on the one
hand, and disclosure and transparency by taxpayers on the other hand (Bundesmin-
isterium fu¨r Finanzen 2012; OECD 2008; Stevens et al. 2012).
In HM, taxation strategies are monitored in an ongoing process and uncertainties
are discussed and solved when they arise rather than negotiated in retrospect. While
companies adopt internal fiscal control systems and disclose tax information on a
regular basis, tax authorities commit to offering timely solutions to tax-related
enquiries and to acting transparently (Bundesministerium fu¨r Finanzen 2012). HM
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offers advantages for both parties alike: Tax authorities benefit from timely tax
collection, adequate tax control frameworks, and full information disclosure by the
companies, while for participating companies the continuous, on-time monitoring
reduces complexity and fosters planning and legal security.
Legal and planning certainty are advertised as strong benefits of HM for
participating companies. Eichfelder and Kegels (2014) provide evidence that
customer-friendly tax administration reduces complexity and compliance costs.
Theoretical analyses in the field of behavioral economics at the firm-level suggest
that greater uncertainty in the interpretation of tax laws encourages firms to develop
aggressive tax planning strategies (Alm 2014). Experimental evidence supports this
notion by showing that reduced uncertainty can increase correct filing and tax
compliance (e.g., Alm et al. 2010). However, findings are equivocal: McGuire et al.
(2014) find that high operational uncertainty can be negatively associated with
aggressive tax planning.
The concept of HM was developed and first introduced in the Netherlands in
2005 (de Widt and Oats 2017; Stevens et al. 2012; van der Hel-van Dijk and Poolen
2013) for large companies that had proven to be compliant in the past and were
willing to participate in the project. In Austria, HM was introduced as a pilot project
in July 2011, embedded in the ‘‘Fair Play Initiative’’ launched by the Austrian
Ministry of Finance. After the pilot phase, the Austrian Ministry of Finance is now
preparing for the long-term implementation of HM.
In the Austrian HM project, only enterprises falling under the responsibility of
the large business auditing unit could apply, which generally included all businesses
with annual turnovers over ten million Euro. After applying for HM, companies
underwent an initial audit to assess their suitability for the project. To be admitted,
companies also had to implement a tax control framework and had to demonstrate a
reliable tax strategy in the past (Schrittwieser and Woischitzschla¨ger 2014; Stiastny
2015). Following admittance, company representatives signed a declaration of
intent together with the Austrian tax authorities. From a legal perspective, the
relationship between companies and the tax authorities remained largely unchanged
(Bundesministerium fu¨r Finanzen 2012; Stiastny 2015). Indeed, HM was mainly
based on trust and voluntary cooperation between the two parties: Companies
committed to acting transparently and to developing their internal tax risk
management, while tax authorities refrained from conducting ex-post audits and
provided non-binding advice and interpretations on current taxation issues.
In the regular HM process, companies’ accountant managers met quarterly with
the responsible tax auditors. During these meetings, comprehensive presentations
and documentation of all current taxation issues took place and the tax authorities
provided feedback on open questions (Schrittwieser and Woischitzschla¨ger 2014;
Stiastny 2015). Participating enterprises ultimately consisted of thirteen company
groups with various national and international corporate structures and a wide range
of business activities, including energy, technology, building materials, apparel,
logistics, food, and drinks.
The implementation of cooperative compliance models in general and of HM in
particular bears various challenges as it represents a major organizational change
program. Participating companies must accept cooperating with the tax authorities
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and agree to fully disclose their tax strategies. On the part of tax authorities, HM is
accompanied by a paradigm shift from command-and-control to mutual trust and
cooperation. The paradigm shift entails the risk of being perceived as a ‘‘sweet
deal’’ for companies and as fostering opportunities for corruption (Stiastny 2015). It
is thus highly relevant to assess subjective beliefs, opinions, and attitudes as
reflected in the subjective representations of HM by participating tax officials and
company employees, by tax officials not directly involved, and by employees of
non-participating companies. At the beginning of the HM pilot project, the Austrian
Ministry of Finance committed to assess subjective representations of HM held by
tax officials and company representatives. The goal to understand acceptance and
resistance towards the new paradigm is of paramount importance to effectively plan
information strategies to avoid misunderstandings and reduce skepticism.
Studies on organizational change stress staff’s and clients’ resistance to change.
Employees may fear losing their status in the organization or missing out on the
advantages of change, and they may expect failure or lack trust due to poor
information. As a result, they may not be sufficiently committed to supporting the
change process. Low commitment and resistance are often observed among those
who feel inadequately informed about goals and change strategies. Poor information
may originate from a lack of communication as well as from rumors and
speculations. In other words, resistance and distrust can quickly gain traction in a
climate of uncertainty, in which actors fear the unknown consequences of change
(e.g., Erwin and Garman 2010; Iverson 1996; Oreg 2006; Palmer et al. 2016; Piderit
2000).
We aim to reveal subjective representations of HM held by different stakeholder
groups either directly involved or not involved in the HM pilot project. We refer to
the social representations theory by Serge Moscovici (Moscovici 1963; also see
Stark et al. 2017) and investigate implicit attitudes and beliefs about HM using free
associations tasks and Likert-type survey items (for free association tasks see, for
instance, Olsen et al. 2018). We assume that those employees in tax administrations
and enterprises who are directly involved in HM feel sufficiently informed and,
thus, perceive the change more positively as compared to non-involved people.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
We assess subjective representations of HM in three different types of organiza-
tions, namely the Austrian tax authorities, companies participating in the HM
program, and companies not participating in HM. Employees of the following
groups were invited to participate in the online survey:
(a) Employees of the tax administration responsible for implementing HM or
otherwise directly involved in the project,
(b) employees of the tax administration who were not directly involved in HM,
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(c) employees of companies participating in the project who were responsible for
HM matters,
(d) employees of participating companies who were not involved in HM
processes, and
(e) employees of companies which were not taking part in the HM project.
To assess changes over time, we collected data at up to three points in time over
the course of the project. Employees of the tax administration participated in three
waves of data collection (April 2013, May 2014, and October 2015). On part of
companies participating in the HM project (HM companies), thirteen company
groups comprising 200 subsidiaries took part in the pilot project. Company groups
entered the HM project at different points in time over the course of the pilot
project. Therefore, employees of HM companies received the first invitation to the
survey in the first 6 months after their companies entered the project, and a second
invitation approximately 2 years after the first survey. The first surveys of HM
companies were completed in Spring–Summer 2013, while the last follow-up
surveys were completed in January 2016. One company group entered the project in
2016 and could, therefore, not participate in the survey. Employees of non-
participating companies were contacted once in November 2015.
The survey was distributed to preselected groups of employees in their particular
organizations who had experience in tax matters. With regard to the Austrian tax
authorities, the Austrian auditing unit for large businesses and tax offices
responsible for large businesses were involved in implementing and maintaining
the HM project. We contacted tax officials and auditors, employees of the legal
departments, as well as managing directors and invited them to participate in the
survey. With regard to HM companies that were part of the HM project, we asked
managers to provide email addresses of their employees involved in tax matters in
their company. To reach out to non-participating companies (non-HM companies)
similar to the participating companies with respect to business size, we sent survey
invitations to Austria’s 550 largest companies, asking their management to forward
the survey to up to ten employees who were responsible for tax matters in their
company.
Overall, we sent out 4495 invitations and received 1136 completed or partly
completed surveys (see Table 1 for summary statistics). At the first wave of data
collection, 1251 invitations to complete the survey were sent out to tax officials; the
response rate was 30.38%. At the second and third wave, the response rate
amounted to 21.0% (out of 1283 invitations) and 21.13% (out of 1235 invitations),
respectively. 57.96% of 88 invited employees of HM-enterprises responded at the
first wave, and 36% (out of 85 invitations) at the second wave. Overall, 550
invitations were sent out to non-HM-enterprises’ general management, who invited
up to ten employees to participate, which resulted in 141 completed surveys.
Regarding the participants’ positions in their organizations, 321 (28%) held
management positions and 815 (72%) were employees at lower levels. On average,
participants had been employed by their organizations for 22.83 years (SD = 10.50,
median = 25 years).
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2.2 Material
The survey was administered online in German and consisted of three parts. The
first section covered information about the goal of the survey and a small number of
demographic questions. For anonymity reasons, we asked respondents to only
indicate their general position and their years of employment in the organization as
well as their gender. To determine their actual involvement in the project,
employees of HM companies and of tax authorities were asked to indicate whether
they had direct experience with the HM pilot project. The second section consisted
of a free association task. Participants were asked to provide up to ten associations
that spontaneously came to their mind in response to the term ‘‘Horizontal
Monitoring’’. Subsequently, we asked them to rate their own associations as either
positive, neutral, or negative.
The third section of the survey comprised five scales that assessed subjective
feelings of being informed about HM, attitudes toward HM, identification with HM,
confidence in one’s own skills to handle HM processes, and subjectively expected
effects of HM. Overall, the scales consisted of 30 items, all of which were phrased
as statements (see Table 6 in Appendix 1 for the complete questionnaire). Topics
and items were jointly developed with the Austrian Ministry of Finance. Participants
were asked to read the statements and to indicate their agreement on a scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely). To prevent arbitrary ratings, participants were
also given the opportunity to mark the alternative ‘‘no answer’’. The survey
followed the same structure for all stakeholder groups. For employees of companies
not involved in the HM project, some items explicitly dealing with direct
participation in the HM project were removed from the questionnaire (see Table 6 in
Appendix 1).
Item analyses showed excellent internal consistency of all five scales, and thus,
high reliability (see Table 2 for summary statistics). Items of each scale were
Table 2 Means and standard deviations of survey scales, inter-correlations, and internal consistencies
(Cronbach alpha)
Scale M (SD) 1 2 3 4 Cronbach
alpha
1 Information (5 items) 4.45 (2.57) – .96
2 Attitude (10 items) 5.64 (1.95) .315 – .92
3 Identification (5 items) 5.62 (2.40) .429 .773 – .95
4 Skills (5 items) 6.07 (2.13) .519 .515 .715 – .88
5 Effects (5 items) 5.84 (2.05) .376 .789 .750 .594 .87
All correlations are significant at p\ .01. Survey scales were constructed by calculating the mean response
to the items in each scale as displayed in Table 6 in Appendix 1. Values express average agreement on a
nine-step scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely)
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aggregated to individual mean scores. In light of the no-answer option and the high
internal consistency of all scales, all participants who answered at least two out of
five (or four out of ten) items for each scale were included in the analyses of the
survey scales.
2.3 Procedure
Employees of the tax authorities and of involved companies received personal
invitations to complete the survey sent by email. Participation in the survey was
voluntary for all invitees. Invitations for employees in non-involved companies
were sent by letters addressed to the companies’ management. Recipients of these
letters were asked to forward the invitation to up to ten employees in the company
who were responsible for tax matters.
Due to the sensitive topic and special concerns about participants’ anonymity,
responses could not be matched across the different survey waves. In the statistical
analyses, we therefore treated all samples at the different waves of data collection as
independent. This represents a methodological shortcoming limiting the interpre-
tation of time effects.
3 Results
3.1 Free associations with the stimulus ‘‘Horizontal Monitoring’’
Participants generated a vast variety of associations in response to the stimulus term
‘‘Horizontal Monitoring’’ (total number of associations by all stakeholder groups
and over all survey waves = 4732, number of unique associations = 3000).
Participants who completed the association task produced on average 4.56
associations (SD = 2.42, median = 4, Q1 = 3, Q3 = 6). Tax officials involved in
the HM project produced on average 5.06 associations (SD = 2.35, median = 5,
Q1 = 3, Q3 = 6) associations; those not involved produced on average 4.51
(SD = 2.51, median = 4, Q1 = 3, Q3 = 6). HM company employees directly
involved in HM produced on average 5.29 (SD = 1.75, median = 5.5, Q1 = 4,
Q3 = 6); those not directly involved produced on average 5.08 (SD = 1.61,
median = 5, Q1 = 4, Q3 = 6). Non-HM company employees produced 3.77
associations (SD = 2.13, median = 4, Q1 = 2, Q3 = 5).
First, we cleared the list of associations by correcting spelling errors and
converting adjectives and verbs to nouns. Second, in cooperation with the Austrian
tax authorities, we inductively developed a categorization system that fits the
associations (Table 3). Third, four research assistants indepently categorized the
associations along the inductively developed categorization system. Inter-rater
reliability (Cohen’s kappa) ranged from .47 to .60. If associations had been assigned
to different categories by the raters, the raters discussed until they reached
consensus about assignments. Table 3 shows the categories and their frequencies by
organizations and HM involvement. It should be noted that in the analysis of
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associations, we did not consider survey waves due to low frequencies in some
stakeholder groups.
The most frequent category contains associations that describe aspects of
cooperation between companies and tax authorities, such as partnership, open
dialog, or cooperation. Cooperation was associated with HM significantly more
Table 3 Frequencies of free associations to the stimulus ‘‘Horizontal Monitoring’’ by categories and
stakeholder groups (absolute counts and relative frequencies within groups in parentheses)
Category Tax authorities HM companies Non-HM
companies
Total
With HM
experience
Without
HM
experience
With HM
experience
Without
HM
experience
Cooperation 118 (.15) 426 (.14) 66 (.19)? 20 (.16) 89 (.19)? 719 (.15)
Legal/planning
certainty
67 (.09) 233 (.08)-- 55 (.16)?? 25 (.19)?? 88 (.19)?? 468 (.10)
Elements of HM 55 (.07) 296 (.10)? 22 (.06) 7 (.05) 29 (.06)- 409 (.09)
Timeliness 56 (.07) 177 (.06)- 32 (.09) 17 (.13)?? 45 (.10)? 327 (.07)
Skepticism 41 (.05) 205 (.07)?? 6 (.02)-- 0 (.00)-- 14 (.03)- 266 (.06)
Saving of resources 44 (.06) 139 (.05)- 33 (.09)?? 18 (.14)?? 29 (.06) 263 (.06)
Openness/transparency 71 (.09)?? 129 (.04)-- 23 (.06) 17 (.13)?? 16 (.03)- 256 (.05)
Tax compliance 39 (.05) 165 (.05) 5 (.01)-- 5 (.04) 22 (.05) 236 (.05)
Control 17 (.02)-- 152 (.05) 10 (.03) 1 (.01)- 41 (.09)?? 221 (.05)
Trust 53 (.07)?? 129 (.04) 29 (.08)?? 6 (.05) 3 (.01)-- 220 (.05)
Change 51 (.06)?? 114 (.04) 10 (.03) 1 (.01)- 8 (.02)- 184 (.04)
Support 28 (.04) 109 (.04) 24 (.07)?? 5 (.04) 15 (.03) 181 (.04)
Extra resources 24 (.03) 138 (.05)? 9 (.03) 0 (.00)- 8 (.02)- 179 (.04)
Justice 27 (.03) 85 (.03) 8 (.02) 2 (.02) 12 (.03) 134 (.03)
HM-development 25 (.03) 83 (.03) 8 (.02) 2 (.02) 8 (.02) 126 (.03)
Stakeholder 15 (.02) 78 (.03)? 0 (.00)-- 0 (.00)- 8 (.02) 101 (.02)
Disapproval 9 (.01) 79 (.03)?? 1 (.00)- 0 (.00) 0 (.00)-- 89 (.02)
Injustice 8 (.01) 62 (.02)? 0 (.00)- 0 (.00) 2 (.00)- 72 (.02)
Lack of information 7 (.01) 46 (.02) 1 (.00)- 0 (.00) 8 (.02) 62 (.01)
Corruption 6 (.01) 4 (.00)- 1 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00)- 52 (.01)
Legal issues 7 (.01) 35 (.01) 4 (.01) 0 (.00) 3 (.01) 49 (.01)
Expertise 7 (.01) 28 (.01) 4 (.01) 2 (.02) 2 (.00) 43 (.01)
Tax evasion 0 (.00)- 21 (.01)? 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 1 (.00) 22 (.00)
Communication
problem
1 (.00) 9 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 0 (.00) 10 (.00)
Else 11 (.01) 35 (.01) 3 (.01) 1 (.01) 8 (.02) 58 (.01)
Total 787 3018 354 129 459 4747
Signs (??, ?, -, --) indicate whether an association category was observed more or less frequently than
expected under the assumption of a uniform distribution of each association-category among groups
(analysis based on standard residuals: ?Z[ 1.69, ??Z[ 2.58,-Z\ 1.69, --Z\ 2.58)
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often by employees of companies involved in the project and, interestingly, also by
employees of companies not participating in HM at all. As compared to employees
not engaged in HM, tax officials who were directly dealing with HM mentioned
significantly more associations related to openness and transparency, trust, and
change. Those not involved in the project had less associations about legal and
planning certainty, timeliness, and saving resources and produced more terms
expressing skepticism, excessive use of resources, disapproval, injustice, and
evasion. Category frequencies show that direct involvement in HM is clearly
connected with more positive attitudes, while tax officials not directly involved are
more skeptical and have more concerns regarding injustice and required financial
and work resources.
Also, in companies involved in HM, employees dealing with HM expressed
generally more positive terms than employees not involved in the project (e.g.,
cooperation, trust, and support). However, differences between involved and non-
involved employees are less pronounced than in the samples of tax officials.
Employees of companies not participating in the HM program showed rather
positive representations, besides the assumption that there is more control of their
business activities by the tax authorities.
We conducted a correspondence analysis based on the frequencies presented in
Table 3. Using the cross-tabulated frequencies of the categorized associations, this
method reveals the underlying structure of the data and creates a dimensional map
of the association categories and the five stakeholder groups (Greenarcre 2007;
Whitlark and Smith 2001). The analysis yielded a two-dimensional structure.
Dimension 1 contributed 58.8% and dimension 2 contributed 28.8% to the inertia.
As Fig. 1 shows, dimension 1 is best explained by the left- and rightmost categories:
The left pole is characterized by advantages of HM (legal/planning certainty, saving
of resources, timeliness, and openness/transparency), the right pole contains
disadvantages and concerns (increased evasion, injustice, corruption, need of extra
resources). While employees of HM companies are located at the pole of
advantages, tax officials not directly involved in HM are closest to the pole of
disadvantages. The second dimension ranges from trust and openness/transparency
located at the top of the diagram to control and lack of information appearing at the
bottom. On this dimension, tax officials directly involved in HM and employees of
HM companies are located at the trust pole, whereas non-HM company employees
are closest to the control pole.
Stakeholder groups and association categories, represented in Fig. 1, can also be
interpreted as spatial distances. The more frequently a combination of associations
and groups appeared in the data, the closer these variables are located to each other
in the map (Abdi 2007; Greenacre 1991). The map displayed in Fig. 1 shows that
tax authorities directly involved in the HM project and employees of HM companies
hold positive representation of HM: openness, transparency, trust, saving of
resources, support, and expertise are association categories located closely to these
three samples. Tax authorities not directly involved in the project are closer to the
association categories indicating disapproval, injustice, legal issues, and tax
evasion, and lack of information, and communication problems. Finally, the group
of employees of companies not involved in HM seem to show a less specific pattern
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of associations. Overall, the association task shows that direct involvement in the
HM project is connected to positive representations.
3.2 Evaluation of free associations to the stimulus ‘‘Horizontal Monitoring’’
Participants rated each of their associations either as negative, neutral, or positive.
The average rating of a participant’s associations—termed polarity index—
represents an index of implicit attitudes toward HM. The polarity index is
expressed by the difference between the numbers of positive and negative
evaluations, divided by the sum of all evaluations per participant (de Rosa 1995).
It ranges from - 1 to ? 1, with negative values indicating more negative attitudes
and values closer to ? 1 reflecting positive attitudes. A second index, the neutrality
index, is derived from the sum of neutral evaluations produced by a participant
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divided by the number of all evaluations produced by the respective participants. It
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more neutral associations.
We conducted multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) with polarity index
and neutrality index as dependent variables and the five stakeholder groups as
independent factor. The analysis revealed a significant effect of F(8, 2034) = 9.739;
p\ .001; g2 = .037. Univariate analyses, conducted separately for polarity and
neutrality indices, showed significant effects for polarity (F(4) = 17.757; p\ .001;
g2 = .065) and neutrality (F(4) = 7.053; p\ .001; g2 = .027). As means in Table 4
show, employees of HM companies hold the most positive implicit associations.
Tax officials with direct HM experience and employees of non-HM companies hold
less favorable attitudes as compared to employees of HM companies, but the most
negative implicit attitudes were measured in the group of tax officials without HM
experience. As compared to the other stakeholder groups, in this latter group we also
observed the highest number of neutral associations.
3.3 Analysis of survey scales
Table 5 displays means of the five scales (information, attitude, identification, skills,
and effects) by stakeholder groups and survey waves. As displayed in Table 5, data
were available from directly involved and not involved tax officials for three waves,
from employees of HM companies for two waves, and from non-HM companies for
one wave. For this reason, we conducted the analysis in three steps.1 First, we
compared all five groups at the first survey wave and found significant differences
between the groups. Second, we assessed changes over time among tax officials and
found a significant difference between participants involved and not involved in the
HM project, but not between survey waves. Third, we assessed change over time
Table 4 Neutrality and polarity indices by stakeholder groups (means and SDs)
Tax authorities HM companies
With HM
experience
(N = 157)
Without HM
experience
(N = 662)
With HM
experience
(N = 57)
Without HM
experience
(N = 24)
Non-HM
companies
(N = 122)
Polarity 0.51 (0.57)b 0.32 (0.63)c 0.80 (0.27)a 0.87 (0.16)a 0.59 (0.58)b
Neutrality 0.18 (0.24)a 0.26 (0.30)b 0.13 (0.15)a 0.11 (0.14)a 0.17 (0.29)a
Superscripts (a, b, c) indicate significant differences, i.e., means with the same superscript do not differ
significantly (p[ .05). The polarity index represents the implicit attitude towards HM as reflected in the
associations; it is calculated by dividing the difference between the number of positive and negative
associations by the total number of associations made by a participant. The neutrality index reflects how
many neutral associations a participant made in relation to the total number of associations
1 We conducted two additional sets of analyses as robustness checks: First, we constructed the scales
using only items which were available for all groups (see Table 6 in Appendix 1) and repeated the three
analyses. Second, we included the control variables gender, position (management vs. other), and years of
employment in the organization into the analyses. Both robustness checks yielded results virtually
identical to the main analyses.
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among HM company employees; again, we did not observe a significant difference
between the survey waves in any of the survey scales.
In the first step of the analysis, we assessed differences in the scales information,
attitude, identification, skills, and effects between the five stakeholder groups at the
first survey wave (see Table 5, first wave). Since we had only one measurement
wave in the group of non-HM company employees, we took into account the
responses of the other stakeholder groups which were gained at the first survey wave
and conducted a multivariate analysis of variance2 with the five scales as the
Table 5 Means and standard deviations of survey scales by survey wave and stakeholder groups (tax
authorities with or without HM experience; HM company employees with or without HM exerience, and
employees of companies not taking part in the HM program)
Tax authorities HM companies Non-HM
companies
With HM
experience
Without HM
experience
With HM
experience
Without HM
experience
1st wave
N 39 275 25 22 111
Information 6.88 (2.22)a 4.30 (2.21)b 7.39 (1.32)a 7.19 (0.95)a 2.57 (2.23)c
Attitude 5.81 (2.10)b 5.00 (1.84)c 7.95 (0.95)a 7.50 (1.09)a 6.43 (1.48)b
Identification 6.66 (2.40)b 4.90 (2.29)c 8.08 (1.29)a 7.90 (1.01)a 6.38 (2.00)b
Skills 7.14 (1.60)b 5.22 (2.04)c 8.17 (0.63)a 7.64 (1.44)a,b 6.96 (1.69)b
Effects 6.46 (2.00)b 5.10 (2.03)c 7.74 (0.80)a 8.00 (1.14)a 6.40 (1.77)b
2nd wave
N 57 168 31 – –
Information 7.14 (1.75) 4.67 (2.20) 7.19 (0.96) – –
Attitude 6.51 (1.54) 5.30 (1.80) 7.88 (0.91) – –
Identification 6.91 (1.76) 5.14 (2.21) 8.04 (1.31) – –
Skills 7.17 (1.45) 5.65 (2.06) 8.07 (0.78) – –
Effects 6.71 (1.41) 5.56 (1.90) 8.04 (1.11) – –
3rd wave
N 59 150 – – –
Information 6.87 (1.70) 4.32 (2.03) – – –
Attitude 6.27 (1.80) 5.14 (2.00) – – –
Identification 6.68 (2.03) 4.70 (2.28) – – –
Skills 7.11 (1.46) 5.49 (2.02) – – –
Effects 6.59 (1.73) 5.58 (2.06) – – –
Superscripts (a, b, c) indicate significant differences between stakeholder groups at the first survey wave, i.e.,
mean values with the same superscript do not differ significantly (p[ .05). Survey scales were constructed
by calculating the mean response to the items in each scale as displayed in Table 6 in Appendix 1. Values
express average agreement on a nine-step scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely)
2 Analyses of variance are commonly used to test whether means of two or more groups differ from each
other. Multivariate analyses of variance, however, incorporate multiple dependent variables, thereby
simultaneously testing the effects of the independent variables on a set of possibly intercorrelated
dependent variables. If a significant effect in a multivariate test is found, we use conventional univariate
analyses of variance for each dependent variable to provide a more detailed view on the effects.
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dependent variables and the stakeholder group as the independent variable. The
analyses revealed a significant effect of F(20, 1864) = 19.821; p\ .001; g2 = .175.
Univariate analysis revealed significant results for all five scales: for information
F(4) = 55.201; p\ .001; g2 = .321; for attitude F(4) = 33.068; p\ .001;
g2 = .221; for identification F(4) = 27.645; p\ .001; g2 = .191; for skills
F(4) = 36.112; p\ .001; g2 = .236; and for effects F(4) = 27.451; p\ .001;
g2 = .190. As means and pairwise comparisons show (see Table 5), employees of
HM companies directly involved and not involved in HM activities as well as tax
officials involved in HM felt best informed and had the most favorable attitudes.
They also identified the most with HM and indicated having high skills and
expecting positive effects. Tax officials not directly involved in HM indicated
lacking information, having less favorable attitudes, identifying less with HM,
having lower skills and not expecting very positive effects. Employees of non-HM
companies admitted not being informed about HM; their values in the other scales,
however, were quite similar to those of the group of tax officials with HM
experience. To confirm group differences on a single-item level, we calculated item
means and conducted pairwise comparisons for each item. As shown in Table 7 in
Appendix 2, the overall results of the item level analysis are very similar to the
pattern found in the scales. In sum, the results support our observations in the
analyses of associations.
In the second step, we assessed changes over time among the groups of tax
officials with and without experience (see Table 5, first two columns). A
multivariate analysis of variance—with the survey scales as dependent variables
and HM experience (yes, no) and survey wave (1, 2, 3) as independent variables—
yielded a significant main effect of experience (F(5, 738) = 37.589; p\ .001;
g2 = .203), but no main effect of survey wave (F(10, 1478) = 1.511; p = .129;
g2 = .010) and no interaction effect (F(10, 1478) = .806; p = .623; g2 = .005). As
already described above, tax officials with HM experience held more favorable
representations than officials not directly involved, and this is true for all three
survey waves.
In the third step, we analyzed changes of time in the group of employees of HM
companies who were dealing with HM in their company (see Table 5, third
column). We conducted another multivariate analysis of variance with the five
survey scales as dependent variables and wave (1, 2) as the independent factor. The
effect of time was far from reaching significance [F(5, 50) = .931; p = .469;
g2 = .085].
4 Conclusions
The aim of this study was to investigate how HM as a new paradigm in tax
administration is perceived by different stakeholder groups (companies participating
in the HM project, tax authorities, and companies not taking part in HM). We
assumed that direct experience with the change project fuels positive representa-
tions, and assessed whether representations of tax officials change over the course of
3 years.
Business Research
123
We find that HM is perceived significantly more positively by tax officials
involved in HM. It is also perceived as highly positive by employees of companies
taking part in the HM pilot project, independent of whether the employees were
directly dealing with HM procedures in their company or not. This pattern of results
was confirmed by the different research methods applied, with contents and
evaluations of associations as well as survey scales yielding a homogeneous picture.
We also find that representations as captured in the questionnaire remained invariant
over time. On the one hand, this suggests that positive perceptions by participants
with HM experience formed at the beginning of the process were maintained
throughout the period of investigation. On the other hand, this also indicates that tax
officials inexperienced in HM remained considerably more skeptical throughout the
evaluation period.
These findings are not surprising given that implementing cooperative compli-
ance strategies requires a new mindset within the tax authorities. HM follows a
progressive understanding of tax administration and may appear difficult to
reconcile with prevailing law for many tax officials who were trained in a ‘‘cops-
and-robbers’’ tradition. Changing the prevailing mindset may take time to develop
and to be accepted. However, as reflected in all three survey waves, tax officials not
directly involved in the project indicated that they were not sufficiently informed
and, thus, it seems that they developed a high degree of skepticism and disapproval.
These results give indications about possible weaknesses of the pilot project that
should be addressed when HM will be included in the regular operation of tax
administration.
Our results are in line with observations in organizational change processes:
people who feel poorly informed and not directly involved in the change process
breed skepticism and distrust and react with resistance and low commitment.
Evidence from other countries that implemented similar approaches to reach
cooperative compliance shows that proactive change management in the form of
staff training and commitment is necessary for the projects’ success (van der Hel-
van Dijk and Poolen 2013). Our results support this view and suggest that change
management among tax authorities has to be improved in order to promote the
acceptance of the new paradigm.
Considering the importance of direct experience with HM, a possible self-
selection has to be kept in mind when interpreting differences between participants
with and without HM experience. Tax authority employees may have decided to
assume responsibility in the project if they were already convinced of their own
qualifications and the project’s benefits and, of course, the same can be assumed for
companies’ decisions to participate in the project. Because of anonymity concerns,
we could not study changes in perceptions in a within-subjects design, which would
have allowed us to draw more reliable conclusions about changes in perceptions
with increasing experience. For instance, we cannot exclude that participants who
developed less favorable perceptions of HM over time stopped participating in
subsequent waves of data collection.
Despite the shortcomings of this study, valuable insights can be gained that
should be taken into account in the long-term implementation of HM in Austria. We
demonstrate that the paradigm shift from command-and-control to cooperative
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relationships entails questioning the prevailing mindset, especially among tax
authorities. We observed that direct contact with the new paradigm is of paramount
importance in the process of implementing HM because employees directly
involved in the project felt informed and had confidence in their skills to deal with
the change in their organizations.
Lack of transparency and the feeling of being poorly informed seem to promote
insecurity and skepticism and cause distrust and resistance. Therefore, in order to
increase acceptance of HM and the willingness to trust and cooperate, especially
during the critical period of implementation, tax administration staff and company
employees need to be fully informed about the project, its goals, and its
implementation steps. Information must be provided not only to employees directly
involved in HM but also to stakeholders outside the project in order to promote the
challenging paradigm shift toward cooperative relationships.
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Appendix 1
Table 6 Questionnaire
Original items English translation
Information
1. Ich bin u¨ber Horizontal Monitoring umfassend
informiert
I am fully informed about Horizontal
Monitoring
2. Die Strategie der Finanzverwaltung betreffend
Horizontal Monitoring ist mir bekannt
I am familiar with the strategy behind
Horizontal Monitoring
3. Ich bin u¨ber die Ziele von Horizontal
Monitoring sehr gut informiert
I am familiar with the goals of Horizontal
Monitoring
4. Ich kenne den aktuellen Stand des
Pilotprojektes Horizontal Monitoring
I know the current status of the Horizontal
Monitoring project
5. Ich bin mit dem Ablauf des Horizontal
Monitoring Prozesses voll vertraut
I am familiar with the procedures of the HM
process
Attitude
6. Ich finde Horizontal Monitoring sehr gut I believe that HM is a good thing
7. Horizontal Monitoring entspricht dem Zeitgeist Horizontal Monitoring corresponds to the
zeitgeist
8. Horizontal Monitoring bringt einen
Imagegewinn fu¨r alle Beteiligten
Horizontal Monitoring improves the image of
all stakeholders
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Table 6 continued
Original items English translation
9. Horizontal Monitoring steht fu¨r eine gute
Zusammenarbeit aller Beteiligten
Horizontal Monitoring stands for good
collaboration among all participants
10. Ich bin u¨berzeugt, dass Horizontal Monitoring
die bisherige Arbeit aller Beteiligten
erleichtert
I am convinced that HM facilitates everyone’s
work
11. Der Nutzen von Horizontal Monitoring wird
u¨berbewertet
The benefits of Horizontal Monitoring are
overrated
12. Die partnerschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
widerspricht der Berufsethik
The cooperative partnership contradicts the
professional ethics
13.* In das Projekt Horizontal Monitoring werden
zu viele Ressourcen investiert
Too many resources are spent for the HM
project
14. Langwierige Betriebspru¨fungen bleiben durch
Horizontal Monitoring nicht erspart
Horizontal Monitoring cannot prevent lengthy
tax audits
15. Ich bezweifle, dass die Aufgaben im
Zusammenhang mit Horizontal Monitoring
rasch behandelt werden ko¨nnen
I doubt whether tasks related to HM can be
carried out in a timely manner
Identification
16. Ich identifiziere mich sehr mit den Zielen von
Horizontal Monitoring
I strongly identify with the goals of Horizontal
Monitoring
17. Ich denke, dass meine Wertvorstellungen mit
denen der Horizontal Monitoring Initiative
der Finanzverwaltung sehr gut zusammen
passen
I believe my values are compatible with the
Horizontal Monitoring project
18.* Ich bin stolz an einem Prozess mitzuwirken, in
dem sich alle Beteiligten als Partner sehen
I am proud to be part of a process in which all
participants are regarded as partners
19.* Ich leiste gerne einen Beitrag zum Gelingen
von Horizontal Monitoring
I am happy to contribute to the success of
Horizontal Monitoring
20.* Ich betrachte Horizontal Monitoring als
Bereicherung meiner ta¨glichen Arbeit
I regard HM as an enrichment of my day-to-
day work
Skills
21.* Fu¨r die aktive Mitarbeit an Horizontal
Monitoring fu¨hle ich mich sehr gut
qualifiziert
I feel qualified for an active participation in
Horizontal Monitoring
22.* Mein Fachwissen fu¨r Horizontal Monitoring ist
auf dem aktuellen Stand
My professional expertise and know-how
concerning Horizontal Monitoring are up to
date
23.* Es ist mir lieber im Horizontal Monitoring
Prozess mit allen Beteiligten zu kooperieren,
als alleine bei Pru¨fungen mitzuwirken
I prefer to cooperate with all stakeholders in
the Horizontal Monitoring process, instead
of working alone in tax audits
24. Ich traue mir zu, im Horizontal Monitoring
Prozess professionell mitwirken zu ko¨nnen
I feel confident working professionally in the
Horizontal Monitoring process
25. Ich arbeite gerne in Teams, so wie es im
Horizontal Monitoring vorgesehen ist
I like working in teams, as it is intended in
Horizontal Monitoring
Effects
26. Ich bin u¨berzeugt, dass durch Horizontal
Monitoring die Steuerehrlichkeit steigt
I am convinced that Horizontal Monitoring
increases tax compliance
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Appendix 2
Table 6 continued
Original items English translation
27. Ich bin u¨berzeugt, dass alle Beteiligten im
Horizontal Monitoring alle relevanten
Unterlagen offen legen
I am convinced that all participants in
Horizontal Monitoring disclose all relevant
documents
28. Ich bin u¨berzeugt, dass die Finanzverwaltung
im Rahmen von Horizontal Monitoring rasch
und kompetent Rechtsausku¨nfte erteilt
I am convinced that in Horizontal Monitoring
the tax authorities give accurate information
in a timely manner
29. Ich sehe einen Vorteil fu¨r Unternehmen, wenn
sie gemeinsam mit der Finanzverwaltung das
interne Steuerkontrollsystem einrichten und
weiterentwickeln
Companies benefit from establishing and
developing internal tax control frameworks
in cooperation with the tax authorities
30. Horizontal Monitoring bringt Planungs- und
Rechtssicherheit fu¨r alle Beteiligten
Horizontal Monitoring provides legal and
planning security for all stakeholders
Responses were given on a nine-point scale expressing agreement to the items from 1 (not at all) to 9
(completely)
*Items removed from the questionnaire for companies not participating in the HM project
Items responses were reversed to construct the scale
Table 7 Means and standard deviations of survey items by stakeholder groups at the first survey wave
Items Tax authorities HM companies
With HM
experience
(N = 32–39)
Without HM
experience
(N = 222–274)
With HM
experience
(N = 23–25)
Without HM
experience
(N = 18–22)
Non-HM
companies
(N = 95–111)
Information
1. 7.41 (2.09)a 4.68 (2.40)b 7.72 (1.34)a 7.45 (1.06)a 2.91 (2.70)c
2. 7.15 (2.28)a 5.27 (2.53)b 7.48 (1.58)a 7.68 (1.04)a 2.78 (2.59)c
3. 7.05 (2.37)a 4.75 (2.50)b 7.75 (1.33)a 7.59 (0.91)a 2.93 (2.63)c
4. 6.41 (2.98)a 3.33 (2.48)b 6.71 (1.92)a 6.71 (1.90)a 2.14 (2.01)c
5. 6.38 (2.62)a 3.48 (2.39)b 7.20 (1.47)a 6.45 (1.50)a 2.10 (2.04)c
Attitude
6. 6.39 (2.66)a 4.85 (2.52)b 8.16 (1.49)a 7.86 (1.32)a 6.98 (1.92)a
7. 6.59 (2.38)a,b 5.83 (2.67)b 8.42 (.97)a 7.62 (2.01)a 6.79 (1.91)a
8. 6.51 (2.63)a 5.06 (2.70)b 7.67 (1.20)a 7.68 (1.92)a 6.57 (2.11)a
9. 7.21 (2.48)b,c 6.04 (2.55)d 8.40 (1.15)a 8.33 (0.80)a,b 7.23 (2.06)c
10. 4.87 (2.65)b 4.28 (2.40)b 7.60 (1.73)a 7.43 (1.60)a 6.45 (2.19)a
11. 5.90 (2.62)c 5.70 (2.53)c 2.29 (1.60)a 2.45 (1.71)a 4.07 (2.18)b
12. 3.10 (2.74)b 4.20 (2.75)c 1.57 (1.47)a 2.00 (1.54)a,b 2.07 (2.00)a
13.* 4.43 (2.82)b,c 4.82 (2.46)c 1.87 (1.18)a 3.21 (1.87)a,b –
14. 4.97 (2.83)b 5.46 (2.62)b 2.68 (1.77)a 2.56 (1.62)a 5.23 (2.49)b
15. 5.10 (2.72)c 5.48 (2.43)d 2.08 (1.00)a 3.45 (2.15)b 4.71 (2.14)c
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